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INTRODUCTION
“If I am not for myself, who will be for me? But if I am only for
myself, what am I?” 1
Nobody likes virtual representation. Even the suggestion of it
carries a taint of illegitimacy. There are good reasons for this. The
history of democratic political development, both in this country and
elsewhere, has been a history of the incremental, halting, painfully
slow, sometimes reversed, always contested replacement of virtual
representation, in which people do not get to vote for their represen-
tatives, with actual representation, in which they do. Over time,
democracies have determined that various groups of people such as
women, racial minorities, and the poor, are capable of choosing their
representatives at the ballot box.
In the United States in particular, this is not just any history. It
is the spine of our dominant democratic narrative. Our major mo-
ments of enfranchisement, many of them memorialized in Article V
Amendments to the Constitution,2 link together into a constitutional
story, and the story has a moral: we are capable of choosing for
ourselves, rather than relying on the wisdom and beneficence of
others—for definitions of “we” that include not just well-heeled
white men but also women, minorities, and the poor. To be sure, our
actual constitutional history is considerably less Whiggish than this
narrative. Just ask the women of Revolutionary-era New Jersey,
who won the right to vote in 1776 and then lost it in 1807 for more
than a hundred years, or the African American men of the former
Confederacy, who won the right to vote during Reconstruction and
then lost it for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.3 The
tragedy of these reversals does not diminish the moral story, but
rather tends to augment it. The right to vote—that is, the right to
actual, direct representation—is a moral beacon by whose light we
now retrospectively view much of our democratic history.
1. Rabbi Hillel, Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 1:14.
2. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV.
3. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 43-47 (rev. ed. 2009). This particular
point—that the expansion of the right to vote has not been the linear, Whiggish story of pro-
gress that Americans often tell—is perhaps the central argument of Keyssar’s excellent book.
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In this great story, virtual representation is cast as a villain. It
played an especially explicit and conspicuous role as a villain in the
fight over women’s suffrage. “[T]he virtual representation argu-
ment,” Reva Siegel explains, was “the core of the antisuffrage case.”4
For more than half a century, suffrage opponents pressed various
related arguments to the effect that women were better off with vir-
tual representation, with their husbands and fathers voting in ways
that would take their interests into account.5 There was a right side
and a wrong side in that debate. When the right side eventually
won,6 our polity crossed a line that later democratic theorists would
view as conceptually significant: for the first time ever, most of the
representation in our system of representative government was
actual rather than virtual.7
This long trajectory, and the legitimate sense of enlightened
democratic accomplishment that accompanies it, leaves virtual rep-
resentation today in a very awkward place, like an unwanted guest
from less democratic times that has greatly overstayed its welcome.
The reasons why we have virtual representation in the first
place—its conceptual foundations and justifications, the normative
universe in which it made sense—have largely been lost.
This is what led the plaintiffs in Evenwel v. Abbott, the 2016
Supreme Court case,8 to see an opening for a very bold and modern
claim, one that had the potential to completely remake our system
of representation in a way not seen since Baker v. Carr.9 Essentially
their claim, about which I will say more below, was that virtual
representation is over, and from now on we ought to draw our maps
in a way that takes into account only actual representation.10 The
4. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 986 (2002). 
5. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (ratified 1920).
7. Robert Dahl argues that this is the point at which a nation begins to be legitimately
categorized as what he calls a polyarchy—essentially, what we might call a democracy—even
if some citizens still remain disenfranchised. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS
233-35 (1989). Before crossing this threshold, the United States disenfranchised the majority
of its citizens, and therefore fell into a different, intermediate category which Dahl calls “male
polyarchies.” Id. at 235.
8. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10. The plaintiffs were not entirely consistent about this, but it is the most coherent way
to understand their claim that representation should focus exclusively on the strength of votes
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present and long-standing practice in the United States is to draw
district lines so that each district contains the same number of
people.11 The Evenwel plaintiffs argued that instead, we should
ignore the nonvoting people and draw districts with equal numbers
of voters.12 The plaintiffs’ key move was to urge the Court to view
and disregard questions of equal representation. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
11. The widespreadness of this practice was, oddly, an issue disputed by the parties in
Evenwel. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124-25. The Court concluded: “Today, all States use
total-population numbers from the census when designing congressional and state-legislative
districts.” Id. at 1124. “[O]nly seven States adjust those census numbers in any meaningful
way.” Id. As far as I can discern, even that is a slight overstatement. There are actually only
four states that adjusted the census population numbers at all in the most recent round of
redistricting, and only two of them did so in a way that seems “meaningful” in terms of raw
numbers. Hawaii and Kansas, two states with sizable military bases, “exclude certain non-
permanent residents, including nonresident members of the military.” Id. at 1124 n.3. That
is a significant adjustment. Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington have statutes
on the books saying they adjust as well, but it turns out these are not “operational as written.”
See id. at 1125 n.3 (quoting Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at
12 n.3, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940)) (regarding Maine and Nebraska); Brief of
Amicus Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law in Support of Appel-
lees and Affirmance at 24 n.10, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940) (noting inter alia that
in New Hampshire in fact “the practice ... is to count everyone”). In Washington’s case, the
Secretary of State has interpreted the state law to require census block data without any
adjustment. Telephone Interview with Nicholas Pharris, Ph.D., Elections Info. Specialist,
Wash. Sec’y of State (July 7, 2017) (notes on file with author). Finally, the majority opinion
in Evenwel reported that California, Delaware, Maryland, and New York make a very small
adjustment of some relevance to the argument of this Article: they “exclude inmates who were
domiciled out-of-state prior to incarceration.” Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 n.3. However,
neither the California nor the Delaware law on this point has yet gone into effect. See CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 21003(a)(1) (West 2017) (going into effect in 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 804A(c) (2017) (same). So, to summarize, total population without any adjustment at all is
the basis for the current district lines in forty-six states—all except Hawaii, Kansas, Mary-
land, and New York, with the adjustment in the latter two states quite small. Stepping back
from the details, on the whole this is a striking degree of convergence on a total-population
base.
Outside the United States, the rule is less uniform. Total population is the most widespread
method, but others also exist. An international think tank surveyed the electoral systems in
eighty-seven countries and found that among the sixty countries that delimit electoral
districts at all, a slim majority used total population; about a third used registered voters; six
countries used total citizen population; one (Lesotho) used voting age population; and one
(Belarus) used the number of voters who voted in the last election. LISA HANDLEY ET AL., INT’L
FOUND. ELECTORAL SYS., DELIMITATION EQUITY PROJECT 17, 28 (2006), https://www.ifes.org/
sites/default/files/delimitations_manual_full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/23VF-E8RC].
12. I am using shorthand here (“voters”). The plaintiffs could not entirely settle on
whether they wished to count eligible voters, citizen voting age population, or some other relat-
ed measure. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 11-12, 17, 22-24, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120
(No. 14-940). They did not propose counting only registered voters or actual voters, although
the logic of their position would in fact provide reasons for adopting those approaches, which
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districting exclusively in terms of the voting power of voters seeking
actual representation, and therefore to disregard—as irrelevant to
the project of districting—the representation of those who cannot
vote.
The plaintiffs in Evenwel surely knew their odds were long. A
victory would have upended every districting map in every jurisdic-
tion in the country. Courts are rightly loath to do that. Furthermore
there was a serious problem of constitutional text looming behind
the case.13 But the plaintiffs also knew they had a shot. The reason
they had a shot was that they were aiming at the soft underbelly of
our present system: its extensive yet undertheorized reliance on
virtual representation.14 At oral argument, Justice Stephen Breyer
brought this up. He was clearly uncomfortable with endorsing this
fundamental aspect of our current system of representation—the
fact that some of those represented cannot vote, and therefore rely
on other people’s votes to choose the people who will represent them.
Breyer said:
That sounds an awful lot [like] what they had in 1750 or
something, where the British Parliament said, well, don’t worry,
America, you’re represented by the people in England because
after all, they represent everybody in the British Empire.... I
mean, that people are being represented through somebody else
is a little—possible, but tough.15
raise problems of their own. See id. at 22-23. Part of their problem was that there is no census
count of eligible voters; as a result, the plaintiffs were in the somewhat odd position of
“urg[ing] the Court to mandate, as a constitutional rule, the use of currently available second-
best alternatives that would not satisfy the rigid legal standard they proffered.” Nathaniel
Persily, Who Counts for One Person, One Vote?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1395, 1398 (2017). In
this sense the plaintiffs’ core proposal was “not only wrong, but ... impossible.” Id. at 1420.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Plaintiff-side amicus briefs in Evenwel pressed this line of attack a few different ways.
See, e.g., Brief of the Cato Institute and Reason Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Ap-
pellants at 14-16, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940) (arguing that total population-based
apportionment is a continuation of theories that once supported the Three-Fifths Clause and
coverture); Brief for Project 21 as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 14, Evenwel, 136
S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940) (arguing that the concept of virtual representation is “a bizarre
suggestion in our political culture” and that “its bizarreness is a clue that the concept ... is
unlikely to have been adopted”—in a way that somewhat mischaracterizes the view of virtual
representation of the appellate panel in the case the brief is quoting (quoting Barnett v. City
of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998))).
15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940) (empha-
sis added).
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In the end the Evenwel plaintiffs lost decisively. The Court held
unanimously that total population is a perfectly fine basis for
drawing district lines.16 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for
the Court, went one step further, elevating the use of total popula-
tion (the current practice) to a sort of default baseline, and suggest-
ing that departures from it require some justification.17 However,
Justice Ginsburg never tried to provide a defense of virtual repre-
sentation, even though her opinion means that our Constitution—
now more explicitly than before—favors an approach to districting
that relies on it.
This Article offers a qualified defense of virtual representation. I
do not claim that virtual representation is superior to actual rep-
resentation. It is not. My main claims instead are: (1) that virtual
representation is an inevitable feature of any democratic system,
including ours; (2) that it has real value, even though it is second-
best to actual representation; and (3) that rather than run away
from virtual representation, we ought to take it seriously—and try
to do it better.
Let us begin with the first and simplest point. Virtual representa-
tion is inevitable. It is an inescapable component not only of the
current American system but of every democratic system, past, pres-
ent, or future. In any society that has some children too young to
vote—and here it does not matter whether the voting age is set at
eighteen or at any other number greater than zero that one might
choose—those children are necessarily represented only virtually in
the halls of government. In any society with immigrants—which is
to say, in nearly any conceivable society in a world with human
migration—as long as immigrants are not immediately granted the
right to vote on the day they arrive, there will be virtual representa-
tion of those immigrants for some period of time.18 In the American
16. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1123.
17. See id. at 1132 (“Appellants have shown no reason for the Court to disturb this long-
standing use of total population.”); see also id. at 1128. Justice Samuel Alito, concurring, was
unwilling to follow Justice Ginsburg down this road. Id. at 1144 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
18. It was once common in the United States to allow some categories of noncitizen
immigrants to vote, and some have argued for reviving and extending this practice. See RON
HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2006). But few argue for enfranchising everyone in this country, regardless of immigration
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system, there are also several groups of adult citizens who are
represented only virtually. In every state, it is possible to lose one’s
right to vote by reason of mental incapacity.19 In every state but two,
people who are in prison lose their right to vote, while of course in
many states, people who were convicted of crimes many years ago
cannot vote.20 All of these people are virtually represented.
status, on the day they arrive here, which is what it would take to eliminate this form of
virtual representation.
19. The boundaries of this category are highly contested. Reformers have made a powerful
case in recent decades that we have been disenfranchising far too many citizens on this
ground, and these efforts have achieved some legal reforms. See Developments in the
Law—The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1180 (2008) (“[D]evelopments in the
law of elections and of disability rights suggest that states may be reversing course on the
arbitrary disenfranchisement of mentally incapacitated persons. Several states have reformed
their disenfranchisement provisions, although these reforms are inconsistent and often not
sufficiently comprehensive.”). Disaggregating the legal disability to vote from other legal
disabilities, such as the power to manage one’s own financial affairs, is a helpful reform. See,
e.g., BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE VOTING RIGHTS OF
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 12 (2016), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/01/voting-rights-guide-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM4S-GAXG] (“Ten states have laws
that bar voting by individuals who are ‘under guardianship.’... Typically, however, [guardian-
ship] determinations involve competencies other than voting .... For example, many
individuals are placed under guardianship because they were unable to care for themselves
during a psychiatric crisis. Yet they may have a good understanding of how elections work
and of the issues at stake in federal, state, and local elections.”).
However, there is arguably some core of people who are truly not able, by reason of their
disability, to form an intention to vote and express that intention in some way. For an unam-
biguous example, consider someone who is in a coma. In my view, because that small group
of people literally cannot, as a positive matter, vote, it is reasonable for the state not to allow
members of this group to have a ballot. But there is much uncertainty about the boundaries
of the group. Given the balance of harms involved, the state ought to err on the side of
enfranchising persons who have any possibility of being able, with reasonable assistance, to
form and express an intention to vote. For our purposes here, my claim is simply as follows:
even if a state adopts the near-maximalist position just outlined on the question of disability
and voting, some core group of citizens will remain who are virtually represented.
20. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES
OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 16 (2012), http://www.sen-
tencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/State-Level-Estimates-of-Felon-Disen
franchisement-in-the-United-States-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VR6-FGVP]; see id. at 1 (“Ap-
proximately 2.5 percent of the total U.S. voting age population—1 of every 40 adults—is disen-
franchised due to a current or previous felony conviction.... In six states—Alabama, Florida,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia—more than 7 percent of the adult population
is disenfranchised.”); Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.
cc/69XZ-L3DC] (“In Maine and Vermont, felons never lose their right to vote, even while they
are incarcerated.”).
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It is possible to deny this. It is possible to claim that really none
of these groups is virtually represented. On this view, the job of an
elected representative is exclusively to represent the people who
vote, or perhaps, those eligible to vote. If we take this view seri-
ously, it would follow that children—the largest group of people who
cannot vote—are not actually the constituents of any representative.
If we accept this, it follows that when a seventeen-year-old contacts
the representative of his local area for constituent services, such as
help navigating a government bureaucracy, or perhaps a nomina-
tion to a military service academy, the representative should, in
theory, politely decline, to the same extent that she would decline
a request from a person whose home address fell outside her
district.21 It would also follow on this view that, when making policy
decisions, a representative ought not view the interests of children
in her district as having any more independent weight in her
decision calculus than the interests of people on the other side of the
country.22 Only voters, on this view, count as the constituents whose
interests an elected official has a special obligation to serve.
This is an implausible view. One indication of its implausibility
is that nobody ever seems to argue for it. Even the plaintiffs in
Evenwel repeatedly claimed that should they win their case, child-
ren would still be constituents of whoever was the representative for
the place they lived—that is, the children would be virtually repre-
sented—even though they would not count for district line-drawing
21. Some might object here that the seventeen-year-old will soon be a constituent, or has
parents who are. Put this aside. Even if we stipulate that the seventeen-year-old is an eman-
cipated minor, whose parents live in some other district, and who plans to move out of this
district, never to return, before turning eighteen and becoming eligible to vote, our normal
practice today would still be to count him as a constituent.
22. There are a number of assumptions packed into this statement but none is very con-
troversial. I am assuming the following model: A representative has some general moral
obligation to pursue policies that are morally good overall; perhaps also a patriotic obligation
to pursue policies good for the people of her country; and finally a specific democratic obli-
gation to pursue policies that benefit her particular constituents. These obligations sometimes
conflict; and pace Edmund Burke, see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, the obligation
to help one’s constituents can sometimes trump the others. The bottom line, on this model,
is that the interests of a constituent ought to have considerably greater weight in a repre-
sentative’s decision calculus than the interests of other people.
Now perhaps in-district children should matter to a representative because they matter to
their parents, who are voting constituents. As I will discuss below, this is precisely the way
that children can arguably get reasonably good virtual representation. See infra notes 33-36
and accompanying text.
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purposes.23 Similarly, a century earlier, opponents of women’s suf-
frage did not claim that women were not constituents or were not
citizens. Instead they argued the opposite: that women were citizens
and constituents, and were already well represented by their elected
officials, who were actively looking out for their best interests.24
Nobody argues for the hardcore no-virtual-representation position
because it does not comport with widely shared conceptions of the
boundaries of the polity. Although immigrants are a more contested
and complex case, nearly everyone agrees that women, children,
prisoners, people who are in comas, and any other citizens who are
not able to vote for whatever reason, fall within the boundaries of
the polity rather than outside. Even if they cannot vote, they count.
Thus, the question is not whether we should have virtual repre-
sentation. We do and we will. The question is how we do it. Once
again, to avoid misunderstanding: Actual representation, where
possible, is best. Our dominant democratic narrative has much to
recommend it. Suffrage should extend broadly; we should disenfran-
chise fewer people than we do now. Even so, there will always be
virtual representation. Such representation has value. As long as we
are going to do this thing, we ought to do it as well as we can.
If we took virtual representation more seriously, we would take
seriously a set of questions that have long been buried in our
democratic discourse. What makes for good virtual representation?
How can a democratic system structure itself in ways that yield
virtual representation that is relatively better rather than worse?
If I cannot vote for myself, who should vote for me? Or more prac-
tically: If I cannot vote, with whom should I be grouped, in order to
ensure reasonably good virtual representation?
The remainder of the Article proceeds in three Parts. The first
Part begins by exploring how and why virtual representation got
cast in its role as villain in our democratic discourse, a story that
begins before the American Revolution. My purpose here is to retell
the story in a way that helps us begin to develop distinctions among
different kinds of virtual representation and arguments for why
23. At oral argument, Evenwel’s lawyer noted that “children are represented at the polls.
They’re represented at the polls by their parents.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 25,
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (No. 14-940).
24. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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some species of virtual representation might be better or worse than
others.
The second Part examines the particular form of geography-based
virtual representation that plays such a large role in the American
democratic system. It then turns to an especially concrete applica-
tion of these ideas: the problem of so-called prison gerrymandering,
which is the question of where and how incarcerated people who
cannot vote ought to count for purposes of representation. Courts
have recently struggled with this problem.25 They have struggled in
part because they have failed to take seriously the idea that even
though prisoners may have only virtual representation, they may
nonetheless have a right to better virtual representation than what
they often receive under current law.
The third, concluding Part explores the role that virtual repre-
sentation plays in the U.S. Constitution. This Part suggests that
although virtual representation is a seriously neglected topic in
modern constitutional thought, some aspects of virtual representa-
tion may, in fact, be constitutionally protected. To see how that
could possibly be the case, let us begin with a closer look at what
went wrong with what must surely have been one of the most abys-
mal systems of virtual representation ever devised.
I. BAD VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION—AND ALTERNATIVES TO IT
Exactly as Justice Breyer suggested at oral argument in Evenwel,
the American hostility to virtual representation stretches all the
way back to the Revolution. Indeed, one way to understand what
that Revolution was about is that the American colonists aimed to
get out from under an exceptionally inadequate form of virtual
representation—so inadequate that (they plausibly argued) it was
a mere fiction, amounting to no representation at all.
Before the Revolution, the theory of the Parliament of Great
Britain was as follows. British voters—meaning, at that time, men
in England, Wales, and Scotland who owned substantial property—
elected representatives to the House of Commons. Representation
was not evenly apportioned across even this population,26 but the
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See CHARLES SEYMOUR, ELECTORAL REFORM IN ENGLAND AND WALES: THE
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Members of Parliament were supposed to be enlightened people who
would look beyond the parochial interests of the specific area that
had elected them. Indeed, despite Britain’s small size, Members of
Parliament were charged with an extraordinary responsibility: to
safeguard the interests of all the subjects across the British Em-
pire.27 This is part of what it means to have an empire: reciprocal
obligations of allegiance and protection extend throughout the
imperium, but other important rights and powers—such as, in this
case, the right to vote—do not.28 Instead, actual representation went
exclusively to (some of) the people of Britain, and the representa-
tives chosen in that way were charged with a duty to provide virtual
representation—a careful consideration and protection of the inter-
ests—of everybody else.
From early on, the American colonists were not impressed with
this arrangement. From their perspective, the implicit guarantee of
virtual representation was essentially fake. Parliament defended
the interests of Britain, not its colonies.29 As the colonists gained
DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY FRANCHISE 1832-1885, at 45-46
(Archon Books 1970) (1915). Prior to the Reform Act of 1832, Britain made almost no effort
to equally apportion Parliament. Each county or borough generally returned two legislators,
and “rotten boroughs” with almost no constituents were common. Id. at 46-49; see also Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 302 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In fact, malapportionment was
so extreme that in 1831, the far south of England, which had roughly as many people as the
far north, had 3.5 times as many MPs. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 302-03. Moreover, many of these
MPs were effectively named by the borough proprietors, such that by some estimates, 180
men could appoint 355 members of Parliament. SEYMOUR, supra, at 50-51.
27. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
175 (1998) (“The significance of such a conception for the role of the representative, as
Blackstone and Thomas Whateley summarized it, was clear: every member of the House of
Commons, ‘though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned serves for the
whole realm,’ and was ‘not bound ... to consult with, or take the advice, of his constituents.’
The general interests of the whole people, however much they may hurt a member’s particular
constituency, ‘ought to be the great Objects of his Attention, and the only Rules for his
Conduct; and to sacrifice these to a partial Advantage in favour of the Place where he was
chosen, would be a Departure from his Duty.’” (quoting THOMAS WHATELY, THE REGULATIONS
LATELY MADE CONCERNING THE COLONIES AND THE TAXES IMPOSED UPON THEM, CONSIDERED
109 (London, 1765))).
28. By this same definition, certain U.S. possessions come clearly into focus as imperial
possessions. If this seems problematic to modern Americans, it should. See Tuaua v. United
States, 788 F.3d 300, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that people born in American Samoa, a
U.S. territory, are not U.S. citizens by birth). See generally Developments in the Law—The
U.S. Territories, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1616 (2017).
29. See, e.g., DENIS JUDD, EMPIRE: THE BRITISH IMPERIAL EXPERIENCE, FROM 1765 TO THE
PRESENT 24 (1996) (describing the escalating breakdown of cooperation between British and
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financial clout and became increasingly frustrated with their in-
ability to command Parliament’s attention, colonists in New York
secretly hired an MP—named Edmund Burke—as their paid agent,
to make sure their interests in Parliament would actually be repre-
sented.30 Even so, by the time of the Declaration of Independence,
the catalog of frustrations and “usurpations,” unjust laws and
special taxes, troops quartered in people’s homes, and all the rest of
it, reflects pretty clearly a British government decision-making pro-
cess that was excruciatingly unresponsive to the colonists’ interests
and pleas.31 As measured by its policy outputs, it would seem that
the quality of virtual representation afforded to the American
colonists in the British Parliament was abysmal.
In fact it was nearly the worst imaginable kind of virtual repre-
sentation. The reasons are fairly obvious. Compared to the colonies,
Britain was located on the other side of an ocean, weeks away by
ship. It was differently situated, economically and politically, in
nearly every relevant respect. There were commonalities to be
sure—a shared language and culture, many extended family ties—
but on the crucial economic and political issues of the day from the
colonists’ point of view, the differences and the physical distance
loomed larger. As Alexander Hamilton pithily asks—in the
musical—“Why should a tiny island across the sea regulate the price
of tea?”32
Not all virtual representation is like this. For instance, we some-
times run virtual representation through families, with children
being represented by their parents and other family members. Then
it becomes somewhat less implausible. There are two reasons for
colonial elites that preceded the Revolution, as “potential concessions by the British govern-
ment” to the colonists’ various demands “were represented as an unacceptable capitulation
by powerful interest groups” within British politics). As the Declaration of Independence
would eventually recount, from the colonists’ point of view, the colonists had appealed to the
British leadership “by the ties of our common kindred,” but the British “have been deaf to the
voice of justice and of consanguinity.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (U.S.
1776). Ancestral familial ties, it seems, did not do the trick.
30. See Calvin Stebbins, Edmund Burke: His Services as Agent of the Province of New
York, 9 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 89, 92-93 (1893), http://www.americanantiquarian.org/
proceedings/44769403.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJG4-G8E5]. They paid him £500 per year—a
substantial salary—plus expenses. Id.
31. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
32. LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, Farmer Refuted, on HAMILTON (ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST
RECORDING) (Atlantic Records 2015).
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this. First, it is reasonable to expect parents to vote in ways that
partly reflect the interests of their children, because their interests
are deeply intertwined with those of their children.33 The old virtual
representation-based arguments against women’s suffrage were
wrong for many reasons that today seem obvious—they violated
women’s basic rights, enforced a sex role hierarchy, and treated
women as children.34 But for actual children, as opposed to adults
who are wrongly being treated as children, it is likely that the votes
of family members will make for some reasonable degree of virtual
representation. For many people—although not everybody—the
single best available answer to the question, “if I cannot vote myself,
who will vote for me?” is a family member. The strength of this point
is part of why opponents of women’s suffrage found it such a useful
argument.
There is also a second and arguably simpler reason. Households
(perhaps by definition, certainly as a general rule) live together in
the same location. People in the same location have some interests
in common. This does some work all by itself. The effect can be
overstated, but a great many policy choices have what we might call
a geographic tilt: they tend to affect people who live in the same lo-
cation in roughly the same way.35 Think of a type of policy proposal
33. Surprisingly little has been written about the virtual representation of children and
its role in the American system. Some scholars have argued for giving parents extra votes to
exercise on behalf of their children. See Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra
Votes on Account of Their Children?: Toward a Conversational Understanding of American
Democracy, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 536-37 (2000); Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote:
Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463, 1502-06 (1998). This would replace our present
system of virtual representation of children with a different and more direct system of virtual
representation of children, but both rely on the intertwining of interests involved in the
parent-child relationship as a way of enabling the virtual representation of children’s inter-
ests. Andrew Rehfeld argues that the focus on interest-representation is misplaced: instead
we ought to view the participatory role of children in democratic institutions as a form of civic
education. Andrew Rehfeld, The Child as Democratic Citizen, 633 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 141, 151-52 (2011). He advocates, inter alia, for giving increasing fractional votes
to children aged twelve and up. Id. at 158-59. I am unaware of any proposal for the represen-
tation of children that would not rely on some form of virtual representation. For a sufficiently
young child, this is the only possible form of representation.
34. Cf. Siegel, supra note 4, at 979-83, 990-91 (discussing the contestation over these same
arguments in the course of the long public debate over women’s suffrage).
35. We could state this “geographic tilt” more formally as a kind of correlation property.
To what extent does the location where a person lives correlate with the effect a given policy
has on the person, for good or ill? A geographic tilt score of 0 would mean there was no
discernible correlation between effect and location, while a geographic tilt score of 1 would
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that would be equally comprehensible in 1776 or today: Should we
tax everybody in a certain jurisdiction in order to build some sort of
public facility, which is useful to most households, in a particular
location? Whether such a proposal is a good idea or not, it is at least
the sort of question where everyone living in the same household
will to some extent be similarly affected. Members of any given
household might ask such questions as: Would we use this proposed
facility? Do we live near enough to its location to benefit from it? A
policy proposal like this will have a substantial geographic tilt. If
proposals of this sort dominate politics—a big if—then if some
members of each household can vote while others cannot, the others
who cannot should receive some reasonable degree of virtual
representation. At least, what they would get is a lot better than
what the American colonists got.36
Consider, in contrast, the lament of Daniel Dulany, the Mayor of
Annapolis, in 1765. He complained that in England, the electors
“are inseparably connected in their interests with the non-electors,”
but on the other hand, “not a single actual elector in England might
be immediately affected by a taxation in America.”37 This was a big
problem. If you think about it, taxing nonvoters and using the funds
to relieve the economic burdens on voters is a very nearly axiomatic
strategy for electoral success—and also a near-certain recipe for
distributive unfairness.
There are three ways around this problem. First, you can en-
franchise the nonvoters. But that may not be possible or workable,
and it may not be a complete solution in any case.38 Second, you can
change the structures of representation so that the voters and the
nonvoters are more “inseparably connected in their interests,” as
Dulany put it—for instance, because they live in the same house-
mean the policy has exactly the same effect on any two people who live at the same spot. Few
policies are at 0, and probably none are at 1, but some types of policies are likely to have
considerable geographic tilt.
36. Although they are far beyond the scope of this Article, there are a range of areas of the
law in which courts must ask whether some people can adequately represent others who did
not choose them. For instance, the plaintiffs in a class action must represent the absent class
members, who did not vote the named plaintiffs into this role. Legal standards in such con-
texts often proceed on parallel tracks: Is there a sufficient degree of convergence, rather than
conflict, between the interests of the representatives and the interests of those they are
supposed to represent? See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)-(4).
37. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83 (1980). 
38. Enfranchisement is not necessarily a recipe for significant political power.
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holds, rather than living an ocean apart. For the white women and
other nonvoting citizens of the new American republic, the Revolu-
tion effectuated this second strategy, trading in a deeply defective
system of virtual representation for a more effective one.
Third, you can change the way government policies and laws
themselves are structured, so that they apply equally to the voters
and the nonvoters alike—thus making it impossible for the voters
(or more broadly, those with more political power) to cause the
enactment of special burdens that fall exclusively or too-dispro-
portionately on the nonvoters (or those with less political power).
Courts can help with this by policing laws, on various doctrinal
grounds, to ensure that they fall evenhandedly on all rather than
placing special burdens on some. These second and third methods
have something in common: unlike the first method, which relies on
enfranchising the nonvoters, both the second and the third methods
work by improving the quality of virtual representation the non-
voters enjoy.
Those who have recently studied or taught constitutional law may
remember a version of the third method playing a role in the classic
case of McCulloch v. Maryland.39 That case famously held that
Maryland could not tax the Bank of the United States. But that was
not quite it. Chief Justice John Marshall held that “a tax paid by the
real property of the bank, in common with the other real property
within the State” would be fine, but a special tax on the Bank of the
United States would not.40 Taxing the Bank, in other words, is only
permissible to the extent that the voters of Maryland themselves,
the people who vote for the legislators who write the tax laws, bear
the same burden.41 This observation about McCulloch, and the quote
from Daniel Dulany above, are not original to me. Both are building
blocks of an important argument in John Hart Ely’s book Democracy
and Distrust: that part of how we protect those who lack political
power is by structuring legal benefits and burdens in such a way
that they are generally applicable both to those with political power
and to those without it.42 That way, those without the power will
enjoy better virtual representation.
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
40. Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
41. See ELY, supra note 37, at 85-86. 
42. See id.
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This is a powerful method of protecting nonvoters (and, more
generally, of protecting politically powerless minorities). It is a
method that resonates with a variety of arguments and legal
doctrines, especially some that were prominent in United States law
in the early nineteenth century, that require laws of broad, general,
and equal applicability.43 Ely argues that this sort of move is the
way to make virtual representation work: the key is “tying the
interests of those without political power to the interests of those
with it.”44 This line of argument has recently been revived by
Bertrall Ross, who contends that judicially enforced requirements
that laws be generally applicable can function as “a promising tool
for protecting the politically marginalized.”45
At a high level of generality, this is clearly the right answer. The
key to good virtual representation is the linkage, or identity, of
politically relevant interests between the people who are actually
represented and the people who are only virtually represented. Both
the second and the third of our strategies aim for this linkage or
identity of interests. But the idea remains abstract. Bringing it
down to earth involves some challenging questions: What, exactly,
is a politically relevant interest? How would we tell if the crucial
links exist? The reason these questions are challenging is because
they require at least the outlines of a theory of politics. At a mini-
mum they require some account of what types of political questions
are the important ones, the ones that define a person’s political
interests. Once you know that, you need a further account of which
variables best predict whether two people—such as a given voter
and a given nonvoter—will find that their views or interests fall on
the same side or different sides of those important questions.
43. See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 669, 673-77 (2014).
44. ELY, supra note 37, at 83.
45. Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal
Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 234 (2012). Similarly, the Constitution
itself guards in various ways against states treating nonresidents worse or differently than
their own (voting) residents. See ELY, supra note 37, at 82-85; Ross, supra, at 236.
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A. Which Interests Matter?
In this Article I will make no attempt to offer an overall, system-
atic account of which questions matter most in politics. Obviously,
this varies. But here are three possible accounts, keyed to important
dimensions of American politics. Each is stylized; none is a complete
description of reality. But it is useful to lay them out because they
differ in their implications for who ought to be virtually represented
by whom.
1. All Politics Is Partisan
According to this account of politics, highly resonant in our cur-
rent polarized era, partisan disagreement, which is chiefly ideologi-
cal in nature, dominates politics. On this view, we have much in
common with co-partisans when it comes to the questions that
matter most; we have much less in common with those on the other
side.
This account of politics is consonant with a particular vision of
virtual representation: one dominated by party, in which I am best
virtually represented by someone who shares my partisan orienta-
tion. This has practical implications. Suppose a certain district is a
safe district for Republicans. A voter who is a Democrat lives there,
always votes against the incumbent, and always ends up on the
losing side. This voter is represented by her representative. But she
may well feel virtually represented not by her local representative
but instead by a representative from somewhere else who shares her
party affiliation.46
46. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that some people today do in fact view their
representation in this way. My city of Austin, Texas, presents an interesting test. It is a
heavily Democratic city, but most of it is represented in Congress by Republicans, each of
whose districts includes only a small slice of Austin. See Election 2016: Texas Results, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/texas?mcubz=3
[https://perma.cc/5VBR-ZQJA]. However, some Austin residents apparently believe that they
are represented by Rep. Lloyd Doggett, a longtime Democrat who now represents only a small
part of the city (and some of San Antonio). Although this is entirely anecdotal, a former
student working in Rep. Doggett’s district office reports a constant stream of constituent
service calls from Austinites whose addresses fall outside Doggett’s district and who are
surprised to be redirected to their actual representative.
Some representatives themselves encourage such views of representation, underscoring the
way partisanship can sometimes trump geography. When many Republican United States
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Something like this idea may be at work in a number of the
standards that judges, advocates, and scholars have proposed in
partisan gerrymandering cases.47 It is also certainly part of what is
going on when many small donors express their support for and
affiliation with legislative candidates who do not directly represent
them by sending campaign money to distant races halfway across
the country. Research suggests that such donations correlate over-
whelmingly with the donor’s political party, suggesting that a lot of
(small) donors are motivated by ideology and partisanship, rather
than any other cross-cutting variable.48 It is not a stretch to imagine
that some of these small donors, especially those who are on the
opposite political side from their own local representative, might
have a subjective sense of being virtually represented by the distant
representatives they are paying money to help elect.
representatives declined to hold town hall meetings during the 2017 Easter recess, amid
controversy over proposals to repeal Obamacare, some Democratic representatives traveled
across district lines to hold their own town halls for people who were actually their colleagues’
constituents. See Amber Phillips, To Hold a Town Hall or Not? It’s a Lose-Lose Situation for
Many Republicans Right Now, WASH. POST (May 13, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2017/05/13/to-hold-a-town-hall-or-not-its-a-lose-lose-situation-for-many-
republicans-right-now [https://perma.cc/FXR7-CU8M]. Meanwhile, social scientists have
found that when Americans express their views to politicians, they are considerably more
likely to reach out to an elected official with whom they share a party affiliation. See David
E. Broockman & Timothy J. Ryan, Preaching to the Choir: Americans Prefer Communicating
to Copartisan Elected Officials, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1093, 1093-94 (2016) (using experimental
designs that included studying constituent communication in states with two senators of
different parties).
47. Any standard that looks to the statewide balance of partisan power is implicitly
relying on an idea of virtual representation. Those who are in districts dominated by the other
party can at least be sure, under such standards, that there are other districts electing repre-
sentatives of their party. Indeed the very idea of comparing the statewide map, in partisan
terms, to the partisan views of the voters—lots of whom may live in the “wrong” district in
partisan terms—suggests a robust if generally unacknowledged role for virtual representa-
tion. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 365 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for
a measure of whether an overall statewide map amounts to an “unjustified entrenching” of
one party over the other); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843, 854, 910 (W.D. Wis.
2016) (three-judge court) (adopting a combination of standards in which the overall statewide
“efficiency gap” in wasted votes between the two parties plays an important role), argued, No.
16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017). But see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
for an examination of specific districts rather than the overall map).
48. Data suggests that over 97 percent of individual donors in the 2016 election cycle
donated to only one political party. Less than 1 percent of donors gave at least a third of their
contributions to both major parties. Donor Demographics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://
www.opensecrets.org/overview/donordemographics.php [https://perma.cc/MBW3-8KGV].
2018] TAKING VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION SERIOUSLY 1699
2. All Politics Is Racial
According to this account of politics, the underlying core dynamic
of politics is not partisanship, but rather membership in a highly
politically salient group. In this country, the strongest contender for
such a group-based dynamic, by far, is race. (A more abstract name
for this model would be: “all politics is group-based.” But in the
United States, it is obvious which group would be the relevant
group, so I will just use “all politics is racial.”) For a relatively clear
example, consider the years of litigation under the Voting Rights
Act in what was once the one-party South.49 At that time, there was
no partisan division, but within the Democratic party there were a
number of important cleavages, of which the most important was
race.
A key prerequisite for bringing a claim under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act today is to prove that voting is sufficiently “racial-
ly polarized.”50 That is another way of saying that racial group mem-
bership must be a sufficiently powerful predictor of most people’s
political choices that it functions as a central axis of politics. To the
degree that this is the case, a different model of virtual representa-
tion emerges. At the extreme where all politics is racial, good virtual
representation for a nonvoter will consist essentially of making sure
that representatives are elected who are the choice of members of
her racial group. This does not necessarily need to happen in her
particular district, but it needs to happen someplace.
This model of representation would predict, uncontroversially,
that the dramatic expansion of black representation in Congress
that followed the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act would
have the effect of helping millions of black people feel better
49. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966),
abrogated by Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
50. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07
(setting out the Senate Factors for determining whether a challenged electoral device violates
section 2, the second of which is the extent of “racially polarized” voting). The Supreme Court
later crystallized these Senate Factors into a three-factor threshold test for racial vote
dilution in which two of the three factors essentially turn on racially polarized voting. Gingles,
478 U.S. at 50-51 (creating a test in which the minority group must be “politically cohesive”
and must show “that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc ... usually to defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate”).
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represented in Congress whether or not they lived in the new
majority-minority districts. There is evidence of this; indeed it is a
commonplace in the political science literature of race and represen-
tation to observe that members of minority groups sometimes feel
that they are better represented not by the white representative of
their own district, but instead by a minority representative elected
in a different district.51
This concept of virtual representation plays a subtle but unmis-
takable role in current voting rights law. When a voter claims racial
vote dilution, she cannot plausibly claim that she is personally en-
titled, in her own district, to a representative who is the choice of
her own racial group. For one thing, it would not be logically possi-
ble for all voters to have such an entitlement; the claims would be
mutually incompatible. If her group has a number of other districts
in which other members of the group can elect their candidates of
choice—and especially if that number of districts is roughly pro-
portional to the minority group’s numbers in the total population—
then that weighs heavily under current law against recognizing her
claim seeking yet another district in which her group can be in the
majority.52 The implicit idea is that such a voter is not being turned
away empty-handed. She may have no shot at winning actual
representation in her own district of the kind that matters most
51. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 37 (1994) (describing how African American voters in majority-
white southern districts often viewed Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. as their
representative in Congress); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE
REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 217-18 (1993); James B. Johnson &
Philip E. Secret, Focus and Style Representational Roles of Congressional Black and Hispanic
Caucus Members, 26 J. BLACK STUD. 245, 258 (1996) (quoting members of the Congressional
Black Caucus on their feelings of obligation to black constituencies beyond their districts—as
one put it: “People throughout ... [my state] wherever they live, if they are African American
or other minorities, consider me to be their representative.” (alteration and omission in
original)); see also Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POLITICS 628, 642 (1999).
52. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (“We hold that no violation of
§ 2 can be found here, where, in spite of continuing discrimination and racial bloc voting,
minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number of districts roughly proportional
to the minority voters’ respective shares in the voting-age population. While such
proportionality is not dispositive in a challenge to single-member districting, it is a relevant
fact in the totality of circumstances to be analyzed when determining whether members of a
minority group have ‘less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’” (quoting Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973)).
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according to this model of politics—a representative who is the
choice of her racial group. But lots of people are stuck in the
minority in their own district. The key is that she is virtually
represented by those who are elected elsewhere, where her group
can elect its candidates of choice. This way of looking at virtual
representation makes sense only if, and to the extent that, race
really is a central axis of politics. That is why a plaintiff must prove
that voting is racially polarized to get a claim like this off the
ground.
3. All Politics Is Local53
According to this final account of the core dynamic of politics, the
questions that matter most are tied to geography. Think of some of
the oldest and most familiar divides in American politics. New York
City versus upstate. The South Carolina Piedmont versus the low
country. Or, on a different and much larger scale, the North versus
the South. On this view, geographic communities share certain
important interests related to such factors as the industries that are
central to their economic life, a shared need for particular forms of
development and infrastructure, a shared cultural background, or
a shared vulnerability to particular threats. This account paints a
picture of different cities, regions, and states as relatively internally
homogenous in their politically salient interests, and relatively
53. The phrase “all politics is local” is a famous twentieth-century aphorism most asso-
ciated with Tip O’Neill, the Democratic Speaker of the House from 1977-1987. See TIP O’NEILL
& GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, AND OTHER RULES OF THE GAME (1994). It may be
notable that the phrase is associated with a person who became famous in this particular
period (although he likely said it earlier). The 1980s were a period of relatively low partisan
polarization within Congress—especially compared to what has happened since—because an
ongoing party realignment was underway but incomplete, leaving many conservative South-
ern Democrats and liberal Northern Republicans in this period. See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, The
Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-
and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since/ [https://perma.cc/Y4XN-PM7Y]. In this less polarized
environment, O’Neill himself cut a number of important bipartisan deals with Republican
President Ronald Reagan. Present-day nostalgia for this period in politics, from some
quarters, may have a lot to do with the fact that American politics itself has changed. See, e.g.,
Charlie Stenholm, How Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan Would Make This Congress Work,
HILL (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits/blog-lawmaker-news/ 235409-
how-ronald-reagan-and-tip-oneill-would-make-this-congress [https://perma.cc/7K78-WD65].
Under today’s political conditions, “all politics is partisan” seems the more plausible aphorism.
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different from one another.54 This account, too, implies a form of
virtual representation: we get good virtual representation when our
neighbors get actual representation, because we share our most
politically salient interests with our neighbors.
Of these three accounts of politics, American political leaders in
the colonial period and the early republic unambiguously chose the
third. They did not plan for—and famously opposed—what turned
out to be the inevitable emergence of political parties. They did not
enfranchise enough nonwhite people to imagine the possibility of a
politics of race. Although there were some significant group-based
divisions in early American politics, these divisions were not where
the action seemed to be. The nation was vaster geographically (by
travel time55) than it is today; the geographic differences loomed
large. They became the de facto basis of the American system of
virtual representation.
B. The American Approach
The American revolutionaries who rallied behind the idea of “no
taxation without representation” thought they were rejecting virtual
representation. In fact they were substituting one system of virtual
representation for another. It was a good trade. The ideas about
54. A number of scholars have argued in the context of redistricting that our law either
does, or should, take account of the continuing centrality of geography to politics—that is,
they have argued that this area of law either does or should operate on the basis of something
like the “all politics is local” model just sketched. “Objectively, people who live nearby tend
to have common interests,” Nick Stephanopoulos argues. “[S]patial closeness correlates with,
and helps generate, [those] interests.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the
Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1391 (2012); see also id. at 1391 n.38 (collect-
ing citations of others making versions of this point). While Stephanopoulos applauds, and
argues for strengthening, the ways U.S. redistricting law tries to protect geographically
defined political communities, Jim Gardner argues more pessimistically that our long
commitment to this geographic conception of politics has bequeathed to us a set of doctrinal
principles that are unable to address modern districting problems such as partisan gerry-
mandering. James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 889–90 (2006).
55. For an illustration of how much closer to one another different parts of America
became, in terms of travel time, over the course of the first century and a half of American his-
tory, see Michael Graham Richard, How Fast Could You Travel Across the U.S. in the 1800s?,
MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Dec. 26, 2012, 11:48 AM), https://www.mnn.com/green-tech/
transportation/stories/how-fast-could-you-travel-across-the-us-in-the-1800s [https://perma.
cc/87KL-69T9].
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representation that emerged during the Revolution were an im-
portant development in the history of democratic thought. They
broke sharply with the ideas of the colonists’ old friend—and
sometime secret agent—Edmund Burke, who had imagined elected
leaders as trustees.56 Trustees can virtually represent everyone’s
interests, and that is their job. As Burke explained: “Parliament is
not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests
... [but] a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that
of the whole.”57 In that case, it does not matter much how the
districts are drawn.
In the early United States, a new model of representation began
to emerge in opposition to this view. Articulated in somewhat dif-
ferent terms by both Federalists and Antifederalists, the new model
imagined that different groups of people in different geographic
areas deserved their own representatives who they actually chose
themselves, and who would indeed fight for specific local interests.58
This emerging model of republican democracy imagined a stronger
connection between representative and constituent than the trustee
model. In a world without parties, that connection ran primarily
56. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 122 (J. Parsons
1793).
57. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Nov. 3, 1774), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 391, 392 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). He continues: “You
choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but
he is a member of parliament.” Id.
58. For Federalist, pro-Constitution versions of this argument, see, for example, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 56, at 64-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Williams & Whiting 1810) (acknowledging
that “[i]t is a sound and important principle, that the representative ought to be acquainted
with the interests and circumstances of his constituents” and addressing the charge that the
House of Representatives “will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its
constituents”); John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 57, at 107, 108 (“The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be
employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature, an exact
portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.”); see also WILLI
PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 233 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., UNC
Press 1980) (1973). The Antifederalist version of this argument held, among other things, that
the new Constitution had too few representatives to actually represent all the diverse
interests of Americans. See, e.g., Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, No. 2
(Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN (Walter
Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) (“[T]o allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers,
mechanics, [etc.] to bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the
legislature, the representation must be considerably numerous”—far more numerous than the
proposed Congress. “The representation cannot be equal ... if the extreme parts of the society
cannot be represented as fully as the central.”).
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through geography.59 To be sure, this model did not emerge fully
formed at the moment of the Revolution. Madison, for his part, was
skeptical that representing small and specific local interests was
either normatively desirable, or positively what the House of Repre-
sentatives would likely do.60 The new model may have seemed too
much like an open embrace of factionalism to those Framers who
still had in mind something of the Burkean model of trustee-like
statesmanship.61 That older model had—and has, today—a number
of attractive features. It is indispensable in any society to have
politicians willing to consider the interests of the whole nation and
not focus exclusively on the interests of their own constituents.
But over time, the new model came to dominate our politics. It led
to the idea of drawing geographic districts, with equal numbers of
people in each. Such districts do important work: they have the
effect of making sure different places, which have different inter-
ests, are equally well represented by population.62 In our system,
this took time. Drawing districts was not a major part of the way
early American governance worked.63 Within state legislatures, rep-
resentation usually went to towns or counties, which meant that
geography drove representation but representatives represented
different numbers of people.64 In congressional elections, districting
was more popular early on in large states, which makes sense: this
was where within-state geographic differences were the most
pronounced and interests the most divergent.65 In large states, dif-
ferent regions made strong enough demands for electing their own
representatives that they generally got their way.66 However, in
smaller states, most early congressional elections were at-large.67
59. Cf. SEYMOUR, supra note 26, at 46.
60. See ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY 98-99 (2005) (“Madison
believed the large district would help neutralize local interests rather than replicate them
within Congress.... Facing multiple local interests [because of the large-sized congressional
districts], the elected representative would then not be beholden to any particular one.”).
61. See BURKE, supra note 56, at 122.
62. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1776-1850, at 36-37 (1987).
63. See id. at 37.
64. Id. at 36. However, in the late eighteenth century, many large states did work to tie
population to representation. Id. at 36-37.
65. Id. at 111.
66. See, e.g., id. at 113.
67. Id. at 108.
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The State of Connecticut, for instance, would elect all of its repre-
sentatives statewide, for numbered seats.68 This meant that differ-
ent geographic regions of Connecticut would not necessarily get any
representation at all.
As American politics became more partisan in the early nine-
teenth century, this statewide method tended to give smaller states
a partisan advantage: a state-level partisan majority could elect an
entire congressional delegation, leaving the other party with noth-
ing. As partisanship deepened, this effect loomed larger, leading to
worries that larger states might soon choose to switch to at-large
methods as well, giving up districting in order to gain this partisan
advantage. In response to this worry about a potential cascade of
states switching to at-large, nongeographic representation, Congress
passed a statute in 1842 mandating that all states elect members of
Congress by district.69
This was a significant and underappreciated moment of stepping
back from the brink. At a liminal point in the long transition from
a politics dominated by geography (that is, “all politics is local”) to
a politics almost completely dominated by the rapidly consolidating
party system (that is, “all politics is partisan”), Congress acted in a
way that protected geographic representation from being entirely
supplanted by partisanship. Our elected leaders in this way
preserved geographic representation as a distinctive building block
of the American democratic model. In doing so, they set in motion
the conflicting incentives and constraints that eventually led to
today’s fights about partisan gerrymandering.
This move preserved a particular form of virtual representation.
Even if you do not or cannot vote, someone chosen by your neighbors
will be elected, and that person will virtually represent you. Is this
a good form of virtual representation? The answer depends a great
68. Id. at 105.
69. Id. at 129-31. Congress was undoubtedly aware of how such a cascade would affect
both the parties and individual Members. See ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43–55 (2013) (arguing that Zagarri’s
account underplays a central motivation for the 1842 Act: the Whig majority’s ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to avoid losing control of the House in the impending 1842 election).
Ironically, even though partisan considerations likely played a substantial role in explaining
why Congress passed this statute, the law’s effect was to place geographic districting on a
much firmer and more permanent footing, thereby preventing geography from being com-
pletely replaced by partisanship.
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deal on what you have in common, or do not have in common, with
your neighbors. The closer the “all politics is local” model comes to
describing politics, the more straightforward the argument for this
form of virtual representation becomes. And yet it was exactly when
partisanship was emerging as a rival or successor to geography as
the central axis of politics that our leaders made this move to pre-
serve the older form of geography-based virtual representation.
Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not
understand what they were doing in these terms. Ideologically, they
opposed virtual representation. As we have seen, this opposition
was an important part of the ideology of the Revolution. In reality,
both before and after the Revolution, most of the representation in
the United States was, in fact, virtual. Women were represented
only virtually everywhere but New Jersey.70 Property requirements
varied, but in a number of states they were high enough that a large
proportion of adult white men had to make do with virtual rather
than actual representation as well.71 Meanwhile, slaves were not
even virtually represented—their presence gave bonus representa-
tion to the masters who owned them, but nobody purported to
virtually represent the slaves.72 Yet even as virtual representation
70. See KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at 43-44 (“Both [New Jersey’s] constitution of 1776 and an
election law passed in 1790 granted the right to vote to all ‘inhabitants’ who otherwise were
qualified: this was interpreted locally to mean that property-owning women could vote. New
Jersey’s policy was exceptional.”); see also id. at 5 (noting that in the colonial era, propertied
widows “in at least a few Massachusetts towns and New York counties ... did legally vote”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 7 (“[A]s the revolution approached, ... the proportion of adult white
males who were eligible to vote was probably less than 60 percent.”); id. at 21 (“By 1790,
according to most estimates, roughly 60 to 70 percent of adult white men (and very few others)
could vote.”). States varied a bit. See David Alexander Bateman, Democratic Exclusion: The
Right to Vote in the United States, United Kingdom, and France 76 tbl.3.2 (2013) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (estimating pre-Revolution enfranchise-
ment in the thirteen colonies and finding that only 51.9 percent of adult white men could vote
in Maryland and only 54.8 percent could vote in New York; in other colonies it was over 60
percent). See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 3, at tbls.A.1, A.2 & A.3 (listing suffrage
requirements, property requirements, and a chronology of property requirements).
72. As Akhil Amar explained: “[I]n 1787, voters could with a straight face claim to
virtually represent the interests of the larger free population—their minor children; their
mothers, daughters, wives, and sisters; their unpropertied adult sons and brothers; and so on.
But masters did not as a rule claim to virtually represent the best interests of their slaves.”
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 92 (2005). “Masters, after all,
claimed the right to maim and sell slaves at will, and to doom their yet unborn posterity to
perpetual bondage. If this could count as virtual representation, anything could.” Id. Sandy
Levinson argues, similarly, that no one would “seriously have suggested that slaves would be
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dominated our system of representative government, the ideology
of the Revolution frowned on it, linking it famously with the great
Revolutionary slogan, “no taxation without representation.”73
It was only the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment that really
cracked open the core of virtual representation in the American
system.74 Up until that point, because most representation was
virtual, the political sphere was rich with arguments that some
kinds of virtual representation were superior to others.75 Such
arguments created a kind of implicit hierarchy of forms of virtual
representation. In this hierarchy, the representation of the colonists
in the British Parliament was firmly at the bottom. The representa-
tion of women and children by their husbands and fathers was
closer to the top. Thus, opponents of women’s suffrage consistently
argued that yes, the virtual representation of the colonists by
distant British electors was bad, but on the other hand, the virtual
‘virtually represented.’... [Slaves] might ‘count’ as part of the ‘apportionment census,’ but no
one imagined that they would, in fact, ‘count’ as part of the community whose opinions or
interests would ever be taken into account.” Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?,” 58
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 939-40 (2014) (footnote omitted). “What it meant to be a chattel slave
was precisely that one was another’s property, entitled to no more solicitude, save that
determined by naked self-interest, than other live chattels such as cattle or horses.” Id. at
939. Some commentators have apparently assumed that the slaves must have been “virtually
represented” since they counted (albeit at a three-fifths ratio) for apportionment purposes. See
Thomas A. Berry, The New Federal Analogy: Evenwel v. Abbott and the History of Congres-
sional Apportionment, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 208, 240-41 (2016) (collecting citations). This
is not the right way to understand the relationship between slavery and democratic
government, for the reasons Amar and Levinson explain.
73. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 27, at 177 (“The Americans’ objection to parliamentary
taxation was ‘not because we have no vote in electing members of Parliament, but because we
are not, and from our local situation never can be, represented there.’ The Americans were in
fact coming to argue that in their clarifying conception of the British empire the mother
country and the colonists did not possess an overriding harmony of interest that made
Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic one common people.”); see also ADAMS, supra note
58, at 231 (“The conflict between the assemblies and Parliament over the Stamp Act resulted
in the articulation of two mutually exclusive theories of representation.”); ROBERT B. MCKAY,
REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 16 (1965) (“In the
United States the idea of representative government was not only accepted but demanded,
the memory of ‘no taxation without representation’ still ringing in the ears of those who devel-
oped the earliest legislative patterns. To a surprising degree even the colonial legislatures had
reflected this interest in representation in proportion to population.”).
74. For a discussion of this trajectory and the role of women’s suffrage in it, see Joseph
Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1338-45 (2011).
75. See, e.g., id. at 1342-45; Siegel, supra note 4, at 981-82.
1708 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1681
representation of women by their husbands and fathers was good.76
Not only, they said, because it promoted the right kind of authority
within the family and maintained separate spheres, but also be-
cause the men were effective and good guardians of the women’s
political interests.77
Those were losing arguments. Nineteenth Amendment advocates
argued that women deserved actual, not virtual, representation, and
eventually they won.78 That was the most decisive moment in the
long shift from the old way of thinking, which assumed a mixed
system of virtual and actual representation, toward the current way
of thinking, in which actual representation is the universally
accepted normative baseline, and virtual representation has come
to seem hollow and tainted.
However, our system never eliminated virtual representation. No
functioning democratic system ever has. As it has evolved, the par-
ticular American method of structuring democratic politics places a
special premium on geographic rather than partisan forms of virtual
representation. That is, our system has embedded in it, at a very
deep level, an assumption that people who live geographically close
to one another have some important political interests in common.
We do not elect our representatives through, for instance, party
lists, a method that ensures a more precise and nuanced degree of
representation for the different political parties—which means
better virtual representation if parties are what matter79—but
76. See generally Siegel, supra note 4, at 981-87 (offering a comprehensive account of these
arguments and their role). For example, Representative John Broomall, Republican of
Pennsylvania, argued in 1868 that in a republican government, “it is necessary that every
citizen may either exercise the right of suffrage himself, or have it exercised for his benefit by
some one who by reason of domestic or social relations with him can be fairly said to represent
his interests.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (1868) (emphasis added). Unlike the
ex-slaves, he argued, women could be fairly placed into this latter virtual representation cate-
gory because of “[t]he primary and natural division of human society ... into families.” Id. 
77. For instance, Senator John Henderson, Republican of Missouri, argued that women
do not vote because the ballot “is not needed for her security. Her interests are best protected
by father, husband, and brother.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3035 (1866). The view
that virtual representation is superior to actual representation for women requires more than
an argument that virtual representation will protect women’s interests. The key additional
step is the ideology of separate spheres. See, e.g., HORACE BUSHNELL, WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE; THE
REFORM AGAINST NATURE 68 (Zenger Publ’g Co. 1978) (1869); Siegel, supra note 4, at 981-87.
78. Siegel, supra note 4, at 1034-35.
79. And, further, if the nonvoters’ party preferences are similar to those of the voters. (As
I will discuss below, party is not all that matters, even in a time of intense partisanship.)
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promises nothing about the geography of representation.80 Some
democracies, like Germany, offer a hybrid of these models, on a view
that both party and geography matter and deserve independent con-
sideration.81 Our system does not.
And yet, for reasons the Framers could not possibly have anti-
cipated, it turns out that our geographic method of representing the
people does a reasonably good job of producing virtual representa-
tion, not just in terms of geography but also in terms of partisanship
and race, as I will discuss in the next Part. Along each of these axes,
it does significant work to ensure that the voters and the nonvoters
are “inseparably connected in their interests.” That is what gives
our current system of virtual representation its power—a power
that remains largely hidden, because today we barely acknowledge
the role virtual representation plays in our democratic order.
II. GOOD VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION?
The winning arguments in Evenwel did not directly invoke virtual
representation or suggest that part of what was at stake in the case
was the quality of virtual representation. There was no need for
such arguments. There are plenty of simpler arguments for why it
makes sense to have equal representation for equal numbers of
people—arguments about the allocation of government resources to
the population or direct constituent services—that do not seem to
invoke the quality of virtual representation at all.
After all, anybody might need constituent services. Everyone ben-
efits from the expenditure of government resources in their area.
These arguments use a very thin and parsimonious conception of
what matters, politically, to an individual. If we took virtual repre-
sentation more seriously, we might be more inclined to ask whether
our system does an adequate job of representing nonvoters’ views
80. In party list systems, seats are allocated to parties and not individual candidates.
ANDREW REYNOLDS ET AL., ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HAND-
BOOK 60 (2005). This can work either in large multimember districts, as in Brazil, where each
state chooses eight to seventy legislators on a party list basis, see id. at 86, or with a single,
nationwide list, as in Israel, see id. at 82. The Israeli approach completely eliminates any
attempt to represent geographic interests, unless such interests form an independent political
party.
81. Id. at 100.
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and interests—their political identities, described in some thicker
way than a virtual pin dropped on a street address.
But this is tricky. Examining people’s political interests, views,
and identities—and determining their most significant aspects—
tends to put a sharp point on the trouble with virtual representation
in modern democratic theory. The trouble is that virtual represen-
tation seems to be in serious tension with a fundamental idea that
we might frame in terms of antipaternalism or self-determination.
Robert Dahl once framed it this way: “[N]o person is, in general,
more likely than yourself to be a better judge of your own good or
interest or to act to bring it about.”82
This principle is not specific to the domain of voting and democ-
racy. Any student of political theory will recognize it as a species of
a more general strain of antipaternalistic thought that plays some
role in every form of liberalism that can trace its lineage to the work
of John Stuart Mill.83 But of course, paternalism is sometimes
necessary. As the name suggests, the paradigm case is when we are
protecting the interests of children. Virtual representation is simi-
larly sometimes necessary—even in the most enlightened modern
democracy that enfranchises everyone who ought to be enfran-
chised. And again the paradigm case—and the largest case in
numerical terms—is children.84 Children, too, have interests that
deserve democratic recognition, even though they cannot vote.
A. Piggybacking on Geography
 The beauty of one person, one vote is the thinness of its concep-
tion of politics. It treats all of us, fundamentally, as people and
nothing more. Of course we layer many more types of protection on
top of one person, one vote—protections for the political power of
racial groups, and perhaps protections for the political power of par-
tisan groups as well.85 But we begin with a layer that is very thin,
82. DAHL, supra note 7, at 99. This is an argument for actual, over virtual, representation.
83. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Project Gutenberg 2011) (1859) [https://
perma.cc/6AW6-4XBP].
84. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 503 (noting that about a quarter of all American citizens
are ineligible to vote because they are children).
85. Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1888, 1908-10 (2012). Regarding part-
isanship, see Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
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one that takes no account of even such basic questions as whether
a person is on the winning or the losing side in elections. Win or
lose, we all count as equals to the doctrine of one person, one vote,
just by being people rather than trees.
Is it possible for a system with such a thin conception of politics
to do the thicker work of ensuring not just virtual representation,
but good virtual representation? Can a virtual pin dropped on a
street address—which is all any of us ever amounts to, as far as the
computers that do the work of one-person, one-vote calculations are
concerned—actually give nonvoters the kind of virtual representa-
tion they deserve? Surprisingly, the answer is a qualified yes.
Because of common patterns of residential segregation, the dead-
simple geographic pin-drop approach tends to be fairly effective at
clumping nonvoters with voters who are “inseparably connected in
their interests” along lines of geography, partisanship, race, and
some other axes besides.
Consider, for instance, the district that the plaintiffs in Evenwel
singled out as the worst, Texas State Senate District 27.86 The
plaintiffs singled it out because a lot of its people cannot vote, in
contrast to a district like District 4, where some of the Evenwel
plaintiffs lived, where a much higher proportion of the population
can vote. The difference arises because District 27, down at the
southern tip of Texas and along the Gulf Coast, including Browns-
ville and part of McAllen, has a lot of children (33 percent) and a lot
of noncitizens (18 percent). This compares to about 26 percent
children and 8 percent noncitizens in District 4, which is in the
outer Houston suburbs.87 But of course those are not the only
differences between these two places. The nonvoters in District 27
actually have a lot of important things in common with the voters,
including race and political party. For example, in District 27, 89
percent of the population is Hispanic. The nonvoters are even more
overwhelmingly Hispanic than the voters, but the difference is not
86. Brief for Appellants at 10-12, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (No. 14-940).
87. Compare Overview of State Senate District 27, Texas, STAT. ATLAS, https://statistical
atlas.com/state-upper-legislative-district/Texas/District-27/Overview [https://perma.cc/9NUN-
ZRX3], with Overview of State Senate District 4, Texas, STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.
com/state-upper-legislative-district/Texas/District-4/Overview [https://perma.cc/2KHP-9C97].
This atlas, which includes data from both the U.S. census and the American Communities
Survey, is the source for all of the numerical comparisons of the two districts in this para-
graph.
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that large. Beyond party and race, harking back to the ideas of
geographic representation from the American Founding Era, the
voters and the nonvoters in these districts have a certain amount in
common because of the dominant industries, occupations, and eco-
nomic circumstances of the places where they live. District 27 has
more than three times the state average percentage of farmers; Dis-
trict 4 has less than half the average. District 4 has lots of scientists
and engineers; District 27 comparatively few. Although both of these
districts run along the Gulf Coast, over the years they have been
struck by different hurricanes in different decades, with different
consequences.
Thus, if you took a few thousand nonvoters out of District 27 and
told them that they would henceforth be represented by the elected
officials of District 4, there would be a reduction in the quality of
their virtual representation. This decline would occur along a
variety of dimensions; we need not decide exactly which dimension
matters most. This scenario might seem far-fetched. But in fact it
is exactly what states do when they remove some voters from one
district, take away their voting rights, and incarcerate them else-
where, in an entirely different district. Thus, perhaps the starkest
contemporary application of the concept of virtual representation is
the current wave of legislation and litigation about where and how
to count prisoners.
B. Prison Gerrymandering and Baker v. Carr
Since 2010, there has been a flurry of state laws altering the way
prisoners are counted within states for districting purposes, taking
advantage of data that the Census Bureau began providing in 2010
that allows states to break out prisoners as a separate category.88
Several blue states—Maryland, New York, California, and Dela-
ware—now require counting inmates not at the location of the
88. See Robert Groves, So, How Do You Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 1,
2010), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2010/03/so-how-do-you-handle-prisons.
html [https://perma.cc/Z26E-VFAE] (“This decade we are releasing early counts of prisoners
(and counts of other group quarters), so that states can leave the prisoners counted where the
prisons are, delete them from the redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other
locale.”).
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prison, but instead, at their last known residence.89 Other groups of
states take various approaches including counting them at the
location of the prison, or not counting them at all.90 Meanwhile,
there has been recent constitutional litigation about this in several
states.91 And nobody seems to have a good idea of what to do with
prisoners whose last known residence is outside the state. It would
take federal legislation, undoubtedly subject to constitutional chal-
lenge, to count out-of-state prisoners in their home states.
The real question in these prison controversies is this: If prisoners
are going to be virtually represented, what method will provide for
the best virtual representation? That question has both a partisan
edge and a racial edge, which are much of the reason for all the
legislation and litigation. Legislatures and courts may be deciding
whether prisoners from urban areas who are disproportionately
racial minorities—and therefore, disproportionately Democrats—
should count toward the population totals in what are often rural
areas that are more conservative, Republican, and white. In states
like New York, at least, this is the heart of the dispute.92
As so often happens in election law, when these cases go to court,
judges generally do not really reach the reasons why the litigants
are in court. Judges tend to focus on the nexus (or lack of nexus)
between prisoners and local government services, as though that is
89. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 21003(b) (West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804A(b) (2017);
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-701(a)(2) (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01
(West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 1-1307 (West 2017); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-
m(13)(b) (McKinney 2017).
90. Many states, and hundreds of localities, count prisoners at the location of their prison.
The Prison Policy Initiative’s Prison Gerrymandering Project conducts the most compre-
hensive accounting of these states and localities. See Impact on Democracy at the State Level,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/problem/state.html [https://
perma.cc/BG6Y-SKS5]; The Impact on Local Democracy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://
www.prisonersofthecensus.org/problem/local.html [https://perma.cc/Z7GU-GSU2]. For two
examples of state statutes that require prisoners to not be counted at all for districting
purposes, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10-306(1) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 46.404(g) (2017).
91. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016); Calvin v. Jefferson
Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2016); Little v. N.Y. St. Task Force on
Demographic Research & Reapportionment, No. 2310-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011).
92. See Little, slip op. at 8-10. Not all states, however, match the classic New York fact
pattern, particularly when it comes to partisanship. See, e.g., Maggie Clark, Could a Recount
of Prisoners Affect Elections?, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2012/10/12/could-a-recount-of-
prisoners-affect-elections [https://perma.cc/DM8S-85YV] (suggesting that the overall partisan
impact, across the country, may be limited). 
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all there is to being a constituent.93 The courts never discuss part-
isanship and they avoid discussing race except to the extent that the
Voting Rights Act clearly requires them to discuss it.94 Courts
generally seem to lack the tools to say anything about the diver-
gence of political interests between, say, voters in a community
where a major prison is the biggest business and source of jobs, and
prisoners whose top political priority might be to reduce mass
incarceration.95
In a jurisdiction whose population consists of nonvoting prisoners
and voting guards, the interests of the voters and the nonvoters, far
from being “inseparably connected,” are fundamentally and pro-
foundly at odds. They are a clear exception to the general rule that
geography tends to yield common interests. Although physically
proximate, they are at least as deeply at odds as the American
colonists and their distant British MPs. They may have found an
even worse form of virtual representation than the one that led to
the American aversion to virtual representation itself.
In fact there is an even better and sharper example, closer to
home. Under Jim Crow, certain districts in the rural South had
large black supermajorities—all disenfranchised—and a voting
population that consisted of a white minority hell-bent on preserv-
ing white rule.96 These districts were a problem. They tended to
elect the most retrograde of white Democrats, the most strongly
opposed to integration and civil rights. Malapportionment gave
them outsized power. Before Baker v. Carr, rural areas, where
93. See, e.g., Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1315-16 (focusing on the lack of representational
nexus between prisoners and local officials); Davidson v. City of Cranston, 188 F. Supp. 3d
146, 152 (D.R.I. 2016) (discussing the lack of “representational nexus” that prisoners had with
the city council and school committee), rev’d, 837 F.3d 135, 145 n.5 (1st Cir. 2016) (“To our
knowledge, the Supreme Court has never adopted a ‘representational nexus’ analysis.”).
94. See, e.g., Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1325-26 (not mentioning race at all in a decision
holding unconstitutional the practice of counting inmates at the location of their prisons in
Florida).
95. The concern that legislators representing prisons might favor high levels of incarcer-
ation is not merely theoretical. See, e.g., Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Ger-
rymandering and the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 364 (2011)
(“[T]he two state senators in New York who led the opposition to efforts to reform New York’s
harsh Rockefeller drug sentencing laws represented districts that were home to more than
17% of the state’s prisoners.”).
96. See J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE
SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (2014).
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population growth had lagged, were overrepresented because of the
failure to redistrict, while urban areas where populations had sky-
rocketed were severely underrepresented. In the South, the popula-
tion-lagging rural areas included many Black Belt districts in which
the black people could not vote and the white minority intended to
keep it that way. Thus, as J. Douglas Smith explains in his recent
book about the one-person, one-vote cases, “[M]alapportionment
served as a cornerstone of white supremacy, ensuring the over-
representation of the most ardent segregationists and thus further
delaying the realization of civil and voting rights for African
Americans.”97 The great political scientist of the South, V.O. Key,
saw this dynamic at work in 1950: “By the overrepresentation of
rural counties in state legislatures, the whites of the black belts
gain an extremely disproportionate strength in state law making,”
giving additional power “to those areas in general the most conser-
vative and in particular the most irreconcilable on the Negro
issue.”98
This political reality, obscure today, was obvious at the time. It is
why Chief Justice Earl Warren maintained that the one-person,
one-vote cases were the most important cases of any type decided
during his tenure—a striking claim for a Chief Justice whose tenure
included, among other cases, Brown v. Board of Education. “If Baker
v. Carr had been in existence fifty years ago, we would have saved
ourselves acute racial troubles. Many of our problems would have
been solved a long time ago ... through the political process rather
than through the courts.”99
97. Id. at 5. For a terrific student note on the racial dimensions of Baker v. Carr, see gen-
erally Robert M. Crea, Note, Racial Discrimination and Baker v. Carr, 30 J. LEGISLATION 289
(2004). Pam Karlan also explores this same point, from a different direction, in an excellent
Article in this volume. See Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Re-
covering Some Lost History of One Person, One Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1921 (2018).
98. V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 666, 670 (2d prtg. 1950). At
least some of the Justices were aware of the problem by 1950 as well. Justice William O.
Douglas, dissenting in an earlier case that upheld Georgia’s county-based primary system,
wrote that such arrangements have “been called the ‘last loophole’ around our decisions
holding that there must be no discrimination because of race in primary as well as in general
elections.” South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Crea, supra
note 97, at 296-97.
99. PAUL MOKE, EARL WARREN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 171 (2015) (quoting an
article by Arthur Goldberg that contains this quote from Warren). In 1961, six months before
the decision in Baker, the Kennedy Administration’s Commission on Civil Rights published
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The undemocratic system that the Supreme Court was stuck with
the task of dismantling in the 1960s was a complex amalgam of mal-
apportionment and Jim Crow disenfranchisement. Chief Justice
Warren was being highly optimistic if he thought that fixing malap-
portionment, by itself, would have yielded a sufficient opening for
the less retrograde elements of the white South to undo Jim Crow
disenfranchisement through the normal political process. That
seems unlikely, although there is no way to know for sure. What we
do know is that in those rural Southern rotten boroughs, the ones
whose power the Court began to dismantle in Baker v. Carr, the
virtual representation that the disenfranchised black citizens
received was abysmal—indeed, it was perverse. It was not the black
citizens’ interests that were being represented, but rather, the in-
terests of their oppressors in maintaining their oppression. In this
way, the pre-Baker mode of southern black virtual representation
resembled the nonrepresentation of the slaves under the three-fifths
compromise more than it resembled the virtual representation of,
say, children through their parents today. The interests of the
voters and the nonvoters in the Jim Crow Black Belt were indeed
“inseparable,” but not in a good way. They were inseparable by
virtue of being fundamentally opposed.100
Any time the government makes policy that disenfranchises some
citizens, there is a risk that in addition to losing their actual rep-
resentation, whoever is disenfranchised might also see a collapse in
the quality of their virtual representation. This need not always
occur, but it seems to occur fairly often. The key question, as always,
is the relationship between the interests of the disenfranchised
group and those of the people who are still able to vote. In the Jim
a report on voting that contained a significant discussion of the racial dimension of mal-
apportionment. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING 113-32 (1961); see also Crea, supra
note 97, at 294.
100. Thomas Berry, in a short article that forms a major part of the Cato Institute’s
Evenwel brief, makes much of the fact that a century earlier, the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were skeptical that white Southerners after the Civil War would fairly represent
the interests of their disenfranchised, recently freed slaves—a concern that unfortunately
turned out to be extremely well-grounded and on the mark. See Berry, supra note 72, at 246-
49. But while Berry aims to leverage this skepticism into a claim that the Framers of the
Reconstruction Amendments were hostile to all virtual representation, there is no good evi-
dence for this broader claim. See id. at 261-62. Given the divergent treatment of women and
Freedmen in the Amendment, it would seem that instead Congress was picking and choosing
among forms of virtual representation with some care.
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Crow context, the perverse virtual-representation result depended
on a number of factors. Black disenfranchisement was so complete
and sweeping that there was no way for the black community to
leverage some political power or form a coalition with white vot-
ers.101 And yet the threat of a potential black majority was real
enough to keep the enfranchised whites on edge about any relax-
ation of Jim Crow’s strictures. Thus the interests of the two groups,
like those of masters and slaves, far from being aligned or “insepa-
rable” in the Daniel Dulany sense, were profoundly and implacably
at odds.
The disenfranchisement of prisoners today is a much more limited
case. Only a small percentage of any community is losing their right
to vote. But there is one important continuity, from the point of view
of virtual representation. In the prison context, the connection
between the voters and the nonvoters has again been severed—in
a different way, through the combination of (1) the practice of
moving the prisoners to distant prisons far from their communities,
and (2) the practice of counting the prisoners at the location of the
prison rather than at their last address. This combination is what
yields a form of virtual representation that has considerable poten-
tial to be perverse, in the sense described above.
Good virtual representation is a relative term. It would be asking
far too much to insist that every nonvoter should be grouped with
voters who closely match their political interests and preferences
along all important dimensions. Clearly, this is impossible—and
even if it were possible, the project of enforcing such a strong re-
quirement would involve the government too much in deciding the
question of exactly which political interests are or ought to be the
salient ones.
This last problem is serious. A court can adjudicate the question
of whether, for instance, voting is racially polarized.102 But it is not
realistic, and arguably not conceptually possible, for any observer
101. This is part of the point of Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes’s classic article, Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
102. Or so current law assumes. For a contrarian view, see Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Kevin M. Quinn & Marisa A. Abrajano, Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 590-
91 (2016) (arguing that even this determination is somewhat messier, and more bound up
with contestable normative assumptions about what matters in politics, than we generally
assume to be the case).
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to determine the precise relative contributions of race, party, geo-
graphy, and/or other axes of political disagreement. Indeed, the
question of their relative importance is itself a question hotly
contested in politics. In a pluralistic society, there will be multiple,
competing answers to this question that will shift over time. To
choose some of these answers over others—to codify today’s answers
as the ground rules for future politics—would freeze the system of
virtual representation in a way that the government lacks a suffi-
cient justification for doing.
And yet, for all that, there really is a stark and obvious difference
between the kind of virtual representation that parents generally
provide to their nonvoting children, and the kind involved in the
prison and Jim Crow fact patterns. The chasm between these ex-
amples is readily apparent when we think in terms of any of the
major axes of politics discussed earlier in this Article (race, party,
geography) and others as well.
This is why the distinctive American geography-obsessed ap-
proach to representation—no party lists, no proportional representa-
tion, just single-member geographic districts—for all its flaws,
amounts to an unintentionally elegant solution to the problem of
how to achieve tolerably good virtual representation. Absent mass
disenfranchisement of the kind that derailed representation under
Jim Crow, and as long as people are counted in the community
where they actually live or have lived—as opposed to, for instance,
a prison where society may have relocated them—the geography-
based approach trades on patterns of residential concentration or
segregation along different axes to ensure tolerably good virtual
representation along a variety of axes at once. We do not have to
choose which axes matter most. And indeed it may not make sense
to treat these axes as wholly separate axes in the first place; inter-
sectional effects are common. Geography-based districting largely
accounts for that too.
To be sure, this virtual representation is only as good, at best, as
the actual representation the voters receive. So here many familiar
problems reappear. Various kinds of vote dilution and gerrymander-
ing can cause entire communities—voters and nonvoters alike—to
lose any real chance they might have to elect a candidate of their
choice. When divisions are sharp across partisan lines or racial
lines, many people who are on the losing end of such map-drawing
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strategies may not see much in the way of substantive representa-
tion, whether or not they vote.
This set of problems is very important, and it is the great
downside of geographic districting. But it is also very familiar, so it
is not the subject of this Article. What is less familiar to us today is
the problem to which geographic districts, drawn according to
population, amount to an elegant solution. That problem is as
follows: How can we ensure that the nonvoters have representation
that approaches what the voters have? Geographic districting by
total population is one surprisingly effective way to do this. It is not
perfect, even as an answer to this particular problem, but it does a
tolerably good job of ensuring that nonvoters will be about as likely
as the voters to see their views and interests, along many of the
most important axes of politics, reflected in representative govern-
ment. This may seem like a low bar, given that both the voters and
the nonvoters may together be subject to familiar and serious
problems such as vote dilution and gerrymandering that are only
imperfectly constrained by law. Yet clearing this bar is no mean
feat. It is hard to find a system that leaves the nonvoters closer to
the position of the voters than the geography-obsessed approach to
representation that Americans have pursued for much of our
history.
C. The Limits of Proportional Representation
There is a long modern tradition of opposition to geography-based
districting, especially single-member districting, from several direc-
tions: advocates of greater political pluralism, opponents of the two-
party duopoly, and advocates for minority representation, among
others. The most powerful line of critique is probably the one that
Lani Guinier has famously advanced: single-member districts are
much worse than other methods (mostly methods involving some
form of proportional representation (PR)) for representing minority
groups.103 Protecting any kind of minority group, racial or otherwise,
in a single-member district system means drawing districts in which
103. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-
Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism:
The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077
(1991).
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the minority is a local majority. This can create or exacerbate
various problems and dysfunctions.104 Why not just allow voters to
group themselves and decide for themselves who they want to join
together with to form enough of a majority to elect a representative?
This is the promise of PR.105
It is a powerful line of critique, one that in some enlightened cir-
cles has become the conventional wisdom: that various alternative
voting systems are simply better than single-member districts for
this reason. There is much truth to this line of critique. But it also
has a serious flaw, one that the argument of this Article helps bring
into focus: PR does not necessarily provide for good virtual represen-
tation. Indeed, it can lead to a kind of erasure of the nonvoters and
their representational interests—and the further down the road
toward “pure” PR one proceeds, the more complete the potential
erasure.
The American single-member district system was designed for a
political world in which most representation was virtual, and geo-
graphy seemed to capture the most important dimensions of politics.
Today we live in a completely different political world where the
most important political axes are probably partisanship and race.
And yet, either way, if people have politically important things in
common with their neighbors, that means that even if they do not
vote, and even if they cannot vote, they may still get tolerably good
virtual representation through the votes of their neighbors. The
facts of Evenwel illustrate this quite well. In districts with a lot of
104. Attempting to protect minority voters through single-member districts inherently
requires some degree of careful line-drawing so that a minority can be a local majority. Such
race-conscious line-drawing, beginning in the 1990s, provoked a forceful if not entirely
coherent backlash from the Supreme Court in the name of colorblindness. See Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 642, 647, 657 (1993). It leads to complex trade-offs between overall minority
political power and the solidity of majority-minority districts. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539
U.S. 461, 485-90 (2003). All of this could be avoided by adopting any one of a range of non-
single-member-district approaches.
105. Indeed, John Stuart Mill enthusiastically endorsed a very rudimentary, party-less
proto-PR proposal (eliminating geographic districting in favor of a nationwide ballot to select
individual candidates) partly on these grounds. “Every member of the House would be the
representative of an unanimous constituency,” he argued, noting as well that “[i]t would be
the minorities chiefly,” who would benefit from the power to band together across geographic
boundaries to elect a candidate. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 142-43 (1861). The flip side of Mill’s point, however, is that a “unanimous”
voting constituency is one that consists exclusively of voters, rather than the voters and non-
voters who comprise a geographic constituency.
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children and a lot of immigrants, there are a lot of nonvoters. But
depending on what those nonvoters have in common with the voters,
they may be able to get surprisingly good virtual representation.106
Single-member districts have many problems, but they make this
possible.
Some alternative voting systems would not require us to trade
away this advantage entirely. For example, a multimember district
(MMD) system with a relatively small number of members per dis-
trict could retain some of the virtual representation properties of a
single-member district. But, the larger the districts, and the more
heterogeneous the population within each district along relevant
axes, the more likely it becomes that the nonvoters will lose their
virtual representation. For a concrete illustration, imagine merging
some of the districts the plaintiffs in Evenwel picked out with others
into one long MMD the length of the Texas Gulf Coast. If you did
this, it would seem unlikely that either the voters or the nonvoters
of Brownsville (the South Texas district with more children and
noncitizens) will have as much representation as they do now, be-
cause comparatively fewer of the people of that area are voters.107
In effect, combining more and more districts together into suc-
cessively larger MMDs gradually reallocates representation away
from total population, and toward actual voters. The further down
this path one goes, toward the endpoint of simple, statewide PR
with no district lines at all, the less virtual representation the
nonvoters will obtain. This will also, predictably, mean less repre-
sentation for any group—such as Hispanics—who have a lower-
than-average ratio of voters to population. This is just math. If
group A contains one hundred people and only thirty voters, while
group B contains one hundred people and sixty voters, combining
the two groups into one district will mean that two thirds of the
district’s voters come from group B. In case of disagreement, group
A, with the lower voter-to-population ratio, will be outvoted. On the
other hand, if each group had a district it dominated, the two groups
would see equal representation.
The same issue arises regardless of why the voter-to-population
ratios vary: different levels of eligibility (because of citizenship, age,
106. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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incarceration, or any other reason), different levels of registration
or turnout among those eligible, or any combination of these factors.
None of this matters if all we care about is the representation of the
voters. But if we care about the representation of the people—in-
cluding the quality of virtual representation that the nonvoters
receive—then it matters a great deal. From that perspective, keep-
ing districts small and single-member has the potential to sweep
away these potential distortions, as long as the group axes most
relevant to politics are also highly correlated with geography. 
Advocates of alternative election systems have not yet adequately
grappled with what it would mean to give all this up.108 It may well
be that alternative election systems would still be superior to our
present single-member-district-based system for other reasons.109 In
an era of intense polarization and dysfunction, this is certainly
possible. But advocates of such changes need to consider the effects
of their proposals on the representation of people who do not or
cannot vote.
III. VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE CONSTITUTION
So far, this Article has proceeded primarily as a genealogy of the
American system of virtual representation and a reconstruction of
how and why it works. Part of my goal has been to show that, al-
though we do not view virtual representation this way, in fact it has
108. Most advocates of alternative electoral systems do not discuss this problem, although
it has occasionally been noted by others. See, e.g., Michael E. Lewyn, When Is Cumulative
Voting Preferable to Single-Member Districting?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 197, 213 (1995); Glenn D.
Magpantay, Asian American Voting Rights and Representation: A Perspective from the
Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739, 778-79 (2001). Lani Guinier, in her argument for multi-
member systems, sees the problem squarely and offers three responses. First, she argues,
multimember systems will still require subdistricting; second, alternative voting schemes
encourage political participation by nonvoters; and third, the “consensus politics” created by
alternative voting mechanisms are better for everyone, including nonvoters. See GUINIER,
supra note 51, at 154-55.
109. There are various potential reasons. Some have to do with the representation of geo-
graphically diffuse minorities, who generally do not benefit from geography-based districting.
Others have to do with the kind of politics that different voting systems might produce.
Richard Briffault argues, for instance, that “there might be a positive value in reducing the
role of territoriality in congressional elections if we thought Congress ought to devote less
time to place-specific pork-barrel projects and meddling in local affairs and more effort to
setting policy on matters of national significance.” Richard Briffault, Race and Representation
After Miller v Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 42.
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long been a central feature of our democratic order. I have tried to
show, as well, that the American system of geographic districting,
despite its many problems, does have the unusual property of ensur-
ing tolerably good virtual representation—in terms of any variable
that people share with their neighbors. We may be able to do better,
but this is a surprisingly good start.
All this may seem a little theoretical. Good virtual representation
may be nice; it may be normatively desirable for various reasons;
but does our Constitution actually impose any requirements on it?
Should we read statutes that implement constitutional com-
mands—in particular, the Voting Rights Act—in ways that take
virtual representation into account? At the end of the day, should a
person who is not allowed to vote be able to make any sort of claim,
either statutory or constitutional, about the inadequacy of the
virtual representation she receives?
There is a good case that the answer to these questions is yes. The
chief reason is that our constitutional order was built in a world
where most of the representation was, in fact, virtual.110 As a result,
a system of virtual representation is built deeply into the text and
structure of the Constitution itself.
Any textual comparison between the U.S. Constitution and its
many younger counterparts around the democratic world reveals a
sharp disjunction in the area of voting and elections. Almost every
other constitution guarantees, by express constitutional text, the
right to vote.111 Ours does not. American courts have instead had to
interpolate the right to vote, along with other fundamental rights,
from more open-textured constitutional provisions such as the Equal
Protection Clause.112 What we do have in the text is two major
structural election provisions, one general and one specific. The
general provision holds that the United States will guarantee states
“a Republican Form of Government.”113 The specific one concerns the
110. See supra Part I.B.
111. See Comparative Constitutions Project, CONSTITUTE, https://www.constituteproject.org/
search?lang=en&key=voteun&status=in_force [https://perma.cc/A25C-W75X] (citing 132 na-
tional constitutions that contain some textual guarantee of a right to vote).
112. See Jane S. Schacter, Unenumerated Democracy: Lessons from the Right to Vote, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 457, 458-65 (2007). The text, of course, includes many enfranchising amend-
ments that prohibit particular forms of discrimination in voting. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV,
XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
113. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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system of representation for the Republic as a whole. It says:
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State.”114 The key phrase here is “whole number
of persons”—not citizens, not voting age population, not eligible vot-
ers, but persons, will be the basis for apportioning representatives.
This is a constitutional framework that unambiguously relies on
virtual representation. From the earliest days of the Republic, rep-
resentation in the House was allocated in a way that explicitly takes
into account the virtual representation of women, children, and all
other “free Persons” (later amended to “persons”) who may or may
not have been allowed to vote.115
This is the constitutional provision that loomed large in the
background of the Evenwel case. It weighs heavily in favor of the
resolution the majority chose: total population as the default base
for apportionment at all levels of government, unless there is some
good justification for departing from that baseline.116 Proponents of
counting only the eligible voters—who were on the losing side in
Evenwel—disagree, arguing that the apportionment framework in
the Constitution applies, by its terms, only to apportioning the seats
in the House of Representatives. And that is true enough.
And yet—apportioning the seats in the House is more than a dry
exercise in structural democratic engineering. It is a model of repre-
sentation in a Republic. Indeed it is the only model the Constitution
provides of what representation in a Republican form of Govern-
ment might look like. This model aims to ensure the representa-
tion—virtual or actual—of all the people, whether eligible to vote or
114. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. This provision is exactly the same as the one in the original
Constitution except that slavery and the Three-Fifths Clause have been removed. The basic
method of apportionment—counting “the whole Number of free Persons,” now “the whole
number of persons”—is unchanged. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”), amended by id. amend. XIV.
115. In parallel to this textual command, the Constitution states that members of the
House will be “chosen ... by the People”—even though only some of “the People,” those who
meet each state’s “Qualifications” for state legislative elections, will actually be allowed to
vote. The rest of “the People” are virtually represented, by constitutional design. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
116. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
2018] TAKING VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION SERIOUSLY 1725
not. The apportionment clauses of Article I and the Fourteenth
Amendment offer a constitutional model of representation that
treats those who are virtually represented as just as important to
the constitutional scheme as those who actually have the right to
vote.
Sandy Levinson has suggested that we ought to distinguish be-
tween the “constitution of conversation,” the open-textured clauses
that yield most constitutional interpretation and argument (such as
freedom of speech and equal protection), and the “constitution of
settlement,” which determines hardwired features of the constitu-
tional structure.117 The apportionment clauses are both. They obvi-
ously settle the question of how we apportion House seats to states.
In that sense they are part of the constitution of settlement, of more
interest to a political scientist than to a constitutional litigant. But
that is not all they do. The apportionment clauses also set out a
distinctive conception of representation, one that treats voters and
nonvoters equally, making both actual and virtual representation
constitutionally essential. This conception of representation is
powerful and generative; it is not easily confined.
Some have suggested that the rules for congressional districting
within a state—who ought to count when drawing the lines for
House districts—need not be the same as the rules for apportioning
seats to states.118 According to this argument, a state could take the
House seats it was awarded on the basis of total population, and
divide them up (on an intrastate basis) according to a different
population base, such as eligible voters. With all due respect to
anyone who is making this argument in good faith, it is absurd. In
practical terms, it would mean that a state like Texas could gain
several House seats entirely, say, because of Hispanic population
growth in one part of the state, but could then award all of those
new House seats to areas hundreds of miles away, perhaps in other,
117. Sanford Levinson, Reflections on What Constitutes ‘a Constitution’: The Importance of
‘Constitutions of Settlement’ and the Potential Irrelevance of Herculean Lawyering, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83-85 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm
Thorburn eds., 2016); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITU-
TIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNMENT 5-13 (2012).
118. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 86, at 42 (“The Constitution’s formula for ap-
portioning Congressional seats across States has no bearing on the requirements for creating
districts within each State.”); Scot A. Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a Pop-
ulation Basis to Form Political Districts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 528 (1994).
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whiter parts of the state with fewer children and noncitizens. That
sort of distortionary windfall would have the effect of disconnecting
representation in the House from its underlying constitutional
basis. If representatives represent people, according to the Constitu-
tion, then they must do so for purposes of both apportionment and
districting. The two simply do not logically come apart.119
 However, the apportionment clauses do not nearly so straightfor-
wardly settle the question of whether a state’s own legislature must
follow the model of republican government, including virtual repre-
sentation, that the Federal Constitution defines.120 That was the
question Evenwel formally left open.121 But there is a strong case to
be made that states too are bound. The early convergence of one-
person, one-vote jurisprudence on a common standard, across the
state-legislative and congressional contexts, even though Reynolds
v. Sims and Wesberry v. Sanders were applying entirely separate
bits of constitutional text,122 strongly suggests that there is a structural
119. Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (locating in these apportionment
clauses “our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers
of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.”).
120. There is a confusing argument here regarding the so-called “federal analogy.” In
applying one person, one vote to state legislative redistricting, the Supreme Court long ago
rejected the “federal analogy”: it said that unlike states of the Union, counties and other sub-
divisions within states have no independent political power within our system. See Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 572-73 (1964) (“We ... find the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant
to state legislative districting schemes.”); see also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376-78
(1963). This is black letter law; subdivisions of states do not have the same role within states
that states do within the Union. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575 (“Political subdivisions of
States—counties, cities, or whatever—never were and never have been considered as sov-
ereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions.”). The Evenwel plaintiffs tried to leverage this point to make an entirely different
argument we might call the “federal analogy” analogy. See Brief for Appellants, supra note
86, at 42-44. Their claim was that because the Court rightly rejected the “federal analogy” just
described (treating counties like little states), we should also reject districting by total
population (the method used in the Federal Constitution) in the context of within-state
districting. See id. That is essentially a non sequitur. The rejected federal analogy was about
creating a federal system within a state, in which counties or other subunits of a state would
function like states in the federal system. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 376-78. Rejecting it says
nothing either way about which other, non-federalism-related features of the U.S.
Constitution—such as districting by total population—must be mirrored in state
constitutional structures.
121. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
122. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (arriving at the one-person, one-vote standard for
congressional malapportionment claims under Article I, Section 2’s requirement that
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constitutional principle at work here that we do not usually identify,
one that holds that all of the people (and not merely the voters) have
an equal constitutional interest in representation.
Perhaps this principle has been obscured by our century-and-a-
half-long trajectory of replacing virtual representation with actual
representation. But despite this arc of constitutional change, in one
way our Constitution has never wavered: virtual representation has
always been a central component of our system of representation.
Indeed, the virtual representation of nonvoting persons has always
counted just as much as the actual representation of voters in the
one model of representation that the Constitution spells out. This
suggests that we ought to take virtual representation more serious-
ly—not only for normative reasons but also for reasons of constitu-
tional fidelity.
CONCLUSION
In the end, virtual representation is second-best representation.
But it deserves far more attention than we have lately given it. If we
took virtual representation more seriously, we might uncover a use-
fully unfamiliar way of thinking about representative government:
one in which we cannot always rely on the simple mechanism of the
franchise to empower all the people, but must also come up with
additional means of ensuring that the government faithfully repre-
sents all the people, however exactly we define the boundaries of
“all.” This way of thinking about representative government is not
new. It is quite old; and its tangled history as a component of argu-
ments against expanding the franchise is part of how, over time, it
became so discredited that we gave up on it.
That was a mistake. The grand march of enfranchisement that is
our dominant democratic narrative will continue, but there are
some people it will never reach. Many of us—most obviously young
children—are both legally and practically disabled from various
forms of democratic participation including voting. It does not say
much for a society’s democratic evolution if that evolution results in
Representatives be chosen “by the People”); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17-18 (arriving at the same
standard for state legislative malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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an erasure of the political interests of those who are the most polit-
ically vulnerable and dependent. We can do better. The first step is
to acknowledge the importance, and the challenge, of using demo-
cratic structures to safeguard the interests of people who— often for
very good reason—cannot vote.
